Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective by Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma
HAL Id: halshs-02430751
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02430751
Submitted on 7 Jan 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource
Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability
Perspective
Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Rostom
To cite this version:
Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Rostom. Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploita-
tion: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective. 2019. ￿halshs-02430751￿
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WP 1937 – December 2019 
 
Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource 
Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability 
Perspective 
Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Zahra Rostom 
 
Abstract: 
 
 
The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. 
We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the 
disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity, while caring 
about future generations. For that purpose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where 
countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, 
within the limits of their stock of natural resources. We use the concept of the recursive core that satisfies 
both coalitional stability and time consistency. We show that this set is nonempty, stating that an 
international long-term agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The presented model can 
be viewed as a tool to refresh the common look at the North-South opposition and sets the conceptual 
framework for the exploration of a fair sharing of the fruits of global economic growth. 
 
Keywords: 
Non-renewable natural resources, Cooperative games, Recursive core 
 
JEL codes: 
C71, C61, F42, Q20, Q32, Q56 
Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource
Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective
Ste´phane GONZALEZ∗ and Fatma Zahra ROSTOM†
e-mails: stephane.gonzalez@univ-st-etienne.fr,fatma.rostom@univ-paris1.fr
Version of December 19, 2019
Abstract
The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global co-
operation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term
agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological
endowments and productive capacity, while caring about future generations. For that pur-
pose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where countries can form coalitions
in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits
of their stock of natural resources. We use the concept of the recursive core that satisfies
both coalitional stability and time consistency. We show that this set is nonempty, stating
that an international long-term agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The
presented model can be viewed as a tool to refresh the common look at the North-South
opposition and sets the conceptual framework for the exploration of a fair sharing of the
fruits of global economic growth.
Keywords: Non-renewable natural resources, Cooperative games, Recursive
core
1 Introduction
The nexus between trade and mineral resource extraction is crucial to the understanding of
wealth creation dynamics. Early stages of mankind are named after the materials from which
tools and weapons were made of: the Bronze Age, which arose fully around 3000 BCE, was
preceded by the Chalcolithic or Copper Age. The Near East was the “kernel of the Age of
Metals”, but was poorly endowed with these materials. Therefore, the “valley urban societies”
had to exchange with the “barbarians” (in the technical archaeological sense), before trade
expanded from the Near East to Europe (Goody, 2012). Modern resource extraction and trade
are of much higher orders of magnitude. Industrialization is characterized by the construction of
infrastructures in the sectors of heavy industry, energy, housing, transport and communication,
and therefore is inevitably associated with an increase in the consumption of raw materials.
The development of trade, necessary to meet an ever-growing demand, is directly linked to the
institutional implementation of free trade agreements in free trade areas.
The debate on the “trade-environment divide” (Esty, 2001) is mostly focused on pollution
issues (Copeland and Taylor, 1994). The interaction between trade and materially sustainable
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growth (Dupuy, 2014) was studied by Asheim (1986) who looked at the effects of opening
economies on the Hartwick rule. Other models focus on two-region trade, the industrialized
North versus the resource exporter South (Chichilnisky, 1993). A rich literature studies the so-
called “resource curse” (Gaitan and Roe, 2012) or the formation of cartels (Kemp and Van Long,
1984) through the traditional Heckscher and Ohlin model (Heckscher and Ohlin, 1991). Strategic
game theory approaches were also used to explore finite resources issues (Van Long, 2011), and
the relationship with trade was studied with two countries (Kagan et al., 2015; Tamasiga and
Bondarev, 2014). However, and despite the call of some game theorists to develop cooperative
game theory (Samuelson, 2016), the literature on material sustainability neglected to treat the
issue through cooperative lenses. Trade can indeed be analyzed through three concepts: “pure
competition”, “coalitional power” and “fair division”. Shapley and Shubik (1969) provide a
static market game for the three varieties of solution and show that, under certain assumptions,
the outcomes converge. In a distinct stream of literature of cooperative games, the question
of renewable and common-pool resources was studied (Funaki and Yamato, 1999), mostly for
fishery or river sharing (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Be´al et al., 2013) problems. However,
these models do not take into account the dynamic aspects of the issue.
The aim of this article is to show that there exist stable international long-term agreements
that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and
productive capacity, while caring about future generations. In this context, countries can form
coalitions and look for the best agreement to optimize their allocation. Members can break an
alliance according to their interest, at any point of time. Dynamic cooperative game theory is
the most fitted framework to tackle this kind of issues, but the literature on the application
of such games is quite limited. Some dynamic cooperative approaches were used to tackle
environmental issues, especially fisheries (Munro, 1979) and pollution (Jørgensen and Zaccour,
2001; Hoofe, 2019). The question of non-renewable resource exhaustibility was raised by d’Albis
and Ambec (2010), who study cooperative allocations among overlapping generations depleting
a natural resource over an infinite future. However, the authors focus on intergenerational
allocations and do not include any international aspect in their model.
In order to find such long-term international agreements, the twin issues of coalitional stabil-
ity and time consistency have to be handled at once. First, it is a question of designing a policy
that no coalition of the present generation has an incentive to refuse. Traditionally, this issue
is tackled by the concept of the core, which is the set of allocations which cannot be improved
upon by any coalition of agents. However, this notion does not deal with the dynamic issues
relevant to the intergenerational sharing of the benefits generated from resource extraction. It
must therefore also ensure that at no point in time the policy initiated then departs from the
one originally planned. Recent papers tackle the issue of dynamic core concepts (Predtetchinski
et al., 2004; Kranich et al., 2005; Lehrer and Scarsini, 2013), but the first studies date back to
the 70’s with the introduction of core concepts for production economies (Boehm, 1974; Becker,
1982), as well as the notion of trust in a monetary economy (Gale, 1978). In the present article,
we use the solution concept of the recursive core, defined by Becker and Chakrabarti (1995)
as a set of allocations for which no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any
time given its accumulation of assets up to that period. This concept satisfies both properties
of coalitional stability and time consistency.
The novelty of our approach is to model the geographical heterogeneity of natural endow-
ments that results from geological processes, as well as the geographical heterogeneity of capital
and technological endowments that results from historical processes. For that purpose, we settle
a cooperative game where countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted
consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits of their stock of natural resources. Trade
is viewed as a market cooperative TU game a` la Shapley and Shubik (1969) where non-renewable
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natural resource inputs are exchanged in such a way as to maximize the total value to be shared
among the coalition. This game is cast into a traditional Ramsey-type model of intergenera-
tional equity, where the Bellman’s dynamic programming framework is used. An international
long-term policy is translated into:
• An action strategy taken by a coalition S. It consists in a quota of natural resources
extraction, a commercial quota and an investment plan proposed to each country at each
time t. An action strategy is optimal for S if the commercial quota optimizes the current
collective production of S, and if the extraction quota and the investment plan ensure the
maximization of long-term consumption.
• A distribution policy of collectively produced consumption goods. Such a policy is said
to be efficient and coalitionally rational if, from some date t onward, a coalition cannot
block an international agreement by undertaking a policy increasing its own long-term
consumption.
In other words, the coalition decides its extraction and investment plan, and deduces the
amount of resources it wishes to trade. It then distributes consumption goods to its members.
We show that there exists a unique optimal path of extraction and investment for each country
in a coalition S, which could be interpreted as quotas proposed by a social planner. As traded
quantities are also unique, we conclude that there exists a unique optimal path for collective
production in a coalition S. We then can build an intertemporal cooperative game where the
worth of S is the discounted sum of consumption – corresponding to the remaining part of
production that is not invested – along this optimal path. We demonstrate that the recursive
core associated to this game is nonempty. This result states that an international long-term
agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The countries, as rational agents, will
stick to this agreement, as no other coalition could offer them a better outcome, at any point in
time. Furthermore, we show that this recursive core contains an infinity of elements, opening
an avenue for the research of a fair distribution from both intergenerational and international
points of view.
The article is organized as follows. The following section presents our formal apparatus and
details the reasoning of the model. In the third section, our main results and their interpretation
are provided. The last section is a discussion on the model and the research avenue it opens.
All proofs are available in the appendix.
2 A Formal Statement of the Problem
2.1 Game Set-Up
Let N be a fixed and finite nonempty set of countries, who are the game players. Countries
have the possibility to form a coalition which can be viewed as a free-trade area. Each country
i ∈ N has a natural resource1 that can be exploited by the infinitely lived country at each
period t ∈ N. Growth is constrained by natural resource availability, its costs of extraction,
as well as the accumulation of capital. Countries have three decisions to make at each period:
resource extraction, resource trade and investment level through savings that will increase the
production capacity of the next period. The remaining created flow of wealth is consumed, and
generations seek to maximize their present consumption as well as the discounted consumption
of their successors. The present model is therefore a cooperative games adaptation of Ramsey’s
benchmark model with traded mineral resources.
1Note that this model could be extended to a finite number of resources.
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At period t and for a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , consider an amount y˘t(S) of a single final
good, which can be viewed as Ricardo’s metaphorical corn in neoclassical theory. The coalition
chooses the amount ηi,t each country i will invest for tomorrow (the seeds to be sowed next
year) to increase the country’s stock of capital Ki,t. This leaves y˘t(S)−∑i∈S ηi,t to the present
consumption of the coalition. The dynamics of i’s capital stock is given by the following law of
motion, τ being the depreciation rate:
Ki,t+1 = Ki,t + ηi,t − τKi,t
The coalition also chooses the quantity ei,t of resources each country will extract from its
available stock Ωi,t. The dynamics of i’s resource stock is given by the following law of motion:
Ωi,t+1 = Ωi,t − ei,t
Extracted resources are exchanged in a free-trade area with no transaction cost, and country
i ends up with a quantity zi,t of input for its domestic production. The country’s productive
sector then uses its production capacity Ki,t and zi,t to produce fi(zi,Ki) through a raw country-
specific production function fi. We assume that, for each i ∈ S, fi : R+ × R+ → R+ satisfies:
(i) fi is continuous, non-decreasing, strictly concave;
(ii) fi(zi, 0) = 0 for each zi ∈ R+;
(iii) fi is differentiable with respect to Ki;
(iv) lim
Ki→0
∂fi(zi,Ki)
∂Ki
> τ for each zi ∈ R+;
(v) lim
Ki→∞
∂fi(zi,Ki)
∂Ki
< τ for each zi ∈ R+.
Note that these conditions are weaker than the Inada conditions. The cost of extraction
ci(ei,t,Ωi,t) of i ∈ N , expressed in consumption units, is represented through a continuous
convex function depending both on the quantity Ωi,t available to the country i and the quantity
ei,t ∈ [0,Ωi,t] extracted at date t.
We consider that each country i has an initial endowment y˘i,0 and that
y˘0(S) =
∑
i∈S
y˘i,0.
The production process takes one period to be achieved, since time is necessary for natural
resource transportation and capital usage. The choice of the trading strategy is made such that
the total net production y˘t+1(S) of each coalition S is maximized through the following static
optimization problem:
maximize
(zi,t)i∈S
∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,Ki,t)− ci(ei,t,Ωi,t)
subject to ∑
i∈S
zi,t =
∑
i∈S
ei,t.
Fig. 2.1 presents a scheme of the model at t and t+ 1.
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Figure 1: Scheme of the state and action dynamics
2.2 Significant Sets
We define Ω¯ ∈ R+ as the total and finite amount of resources on Earth. Following neoclassical
arguments, the assumptions on the function fi as well as the dynamics of Ki ensure that there
exists K¯ ∈ R+ such that for each i ∈ S and for each t ∈ N, Ki,t ≤ K¯. As a consequence, there
exists ¯˘y ∈ R+ such that for each t ∈ N, y˘t(S) ≤ ¯˘y.
Let Ω(S) = (Ωi)i∈S (or simply Ω if there is no danger of confusion) be the vector of natural
resource stocks and K(S) = (Ki)i∈S (or simply K if there is no danger of confusion) be the
vector of capital stocks. The state space S(S) is defined by:
S(S) := {(Ω(S),K(S), y˘(S)) ∈ RS+ × RS+ × R+, y˘(S) ≤ ¯˘y and∀i ∈ S, Ωi ≤ Ω¯,Ki ≤ K¯}.
Let e(S) = (ei)i∈S (or simply e if there is no danger of confusion) be the vector of extraction
and η(S) = (ηi)i∈S (or simply η if there is no danger of confusion) be the vector of investment.
The action space A(S) is defined by:
A(S) := {(e(S), η(S)) ∈ RS+ × RS+, ∀i ∈ S, ei ≤ Ω¯, ηi ≤ ¯˘y}.
The set of feasible vectors of extraction e(S) for a coalition S with a stock described by
Ω(S) is
EΩ(S) := {e(S) ∈ (R+)S , ei ≤ Ωi}.
We now define the set of feasible vectors of investment η(S) for a coalition S by
I y˘(S)(S) := {η(S) ∈ (R+)S ,
∑
i∈S
ηi ≤ y˘(S)}.
We can therefore define the set of couples (e(S), η(S)) of feasible actions by:
ΦΩ,y˘(S)(S) := {(e(S), η(S)) | e(S) ∈ EΩ(S), η(S) ∈ I y˘(S)(S)},
Now, the set of available resource input after the exchange z(S) = (zi)i∈S (or simply z if
there is no danger of confusion) is:
Ze(S) := {z(S) ∈ (R+)S ,
∑
i∈S
zi =
∑
i∈S
ei}.
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2.3 Coalitional and Intergenerational Worth
At each period, countries belonging to a coalition S when the production is y˘(S) and the
investment is η ∈ I y˘(S)(S) will earn a worth vy˘(S),η(S) that shall not be more than their
consumption:
∀y˘(S) ∈ R+, ∀η ∈ I y˘(S)(S) vy˘(S),η(S) = y˘(S)−
∑
i∈S
ηi.
Let us now zoom up in the time scale, and describe the behavior of countries from an in-
tertemporal viewpoint. Let δ ∈]0, 1[ be the discount factor. The intertemporal worth V Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S)
of the coalition S is defined as the value of the following dynamic programming problem:
maximize
(et,ηt)t∈N
∑
t∈N
δtvy˘t(S),ηt(S)
subject to
Ωt+1 = Ωt − et, t ∈ N
Kt+1 = (1− τ)Kt + ηt, t ∈ N
y˘t+1(S) = max
{∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,Ki,t)− ci(ei,t,Ωi,t), (zi,t)i∈S ∈ Ze(S)
}
, t ∈ N
(et, ηt) ∈ ΦΩt,y˘t(S)(S), t ∈ N
(1)
3 Existence of Distribution Policies Along the Optimal Path
3.1 Optimal Action Strategy
The following proposition establishes that, given a flow of resource extracted by each country,
there exists a unique optimal way to trade that can be interpreted as an optimal commercial
quota.
Proposition 1. The function (Ω, e,K) 7→ max
{∑
i∈S fi(zi,Ki)−ci(ei,Ωi), (zi)i∈S ∈ Ze(S)
}
is
continuous and strictly concave over [0, Ω¯]S×[0, Ω¯]S×[0, K¯]S . Furthermore, for each (Ω, e,K) ∈
[0, Ω¯]S× [0, Ω¯]S× [0, K¯]S , there exists a unique z∗ ∈ Ze(S) – continuously varying with (Ω, e,K)
– such that
max
{∑
i∈S
fi(zi,Ki)− ci(ei,Ωi), (zi)i∈S ∈ Ze(S)
}
=
∑
i∈S
fi(z∗i ,Ki)− ci(ei,Ωi).
The next proposition states that, given the initial endowments of each country, there exists
a unique optimal way to extract and to invest that can be interpreted as optimal extraction
quota and investment plan.
Proposition 2. For each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , and each (Ωi,0)i∈S ∈ [0, Ω¯]S , (Ki,0)i∈S ∈
[0, K¯]S and y˘0(S) ∈ [0, ¯˘y], there exists a unique optimal path of extraction and investment to
the dynamic programming problem (1).
3.2 Efficient and Coalitionally Rational Distribution Policy
We showed that there exists a unique optimal path of extraction and investment for each country
in a coalition S, which could be interpreted as quotas imposed by a social planner. This leads
to a unique path of resource and capital stocks. As traded quantities are also unique, we
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can conclude that there exists a unique path for collective production in a coalition S. The
consumption path of each country, for its part, is not unique and depends upon the sharing rule
decided by the coalition. The following result states that an international long-term agreement
along this optimal path will be self-enforcing. The countries, as rational agents, will stick to
this agreement, as no other coalition could offer them a better outcome, at any point in time.
In other words, this agreement within N cannot be dominated by any coalition S ⊆ N . For
that purpose, we adapt the concept of recursive core to our framework. This concept satisfies
the properties of efficiency, coalitional rationality and also tackles the crucial issue of time
consistency. Let us now formally introduce this concept.
For each initial state (Ω,K, y˘) ∈ [0; Ω¯]N × [0, K¯]N × [0, ¯˘y] of the grand coalition N , there
exists a unique optimal extraction and investment solution
(
e∗t (N), η∗t (N)
)
t∈N to the dynamic
programming problem (1) according to Proposition 2. Let
(
Ω∗t (N),K∗t (N), y˘∗t (N)
)
t∈N be the
state evolution corresponding to the optimal path when the initial state is (Ω,K, y˘). Denote by(
Ω∗S,t(N),K∗S,t(N), y˘∗S,t(N)
)
the projection
(
Ω∗i,t(N),K∗i,t(N), y˘∗i,t(N)
)
i∈S of
(
Ω∗t (N),K∗t (N), y˘∗t (N)
)
.
Note that the consumption path, for its part, is not unique. An international distribution policy,
pi, is a mapping which associates with each initial state (Ω,K, y˘) a path of consumption vector
(pii,t(Ω,K, y˘))i∈N,t∈N such that ∀t ∈ N:∑
i∈N
pii,t(Ω,K, y˘) = y˘∗t (N)−
∑
i∈N
η∗i,t(N)
A policy pi is dominated by S at date T if there exists an initial state (Ω,K, y˘) such that:
+∞∑
t=0
δt
∑
i∈S
pii,t+T (Ω,K, y˘) < V Ω
∗
S,T (N),K
∗
S,T (N),y˘
∗
S,T (N)(S).
The recursive core C(Ω,K, y˘) is the set of undominated policies when the initial state is
(Ω,K, y˘). The following theorem states that the recursive core of this set-up is nonempty
whatever the initial state is. It further indicates that this core contains an infinity of elements,
corresponding to an infinite way of distributing consumption streams among the countries of
the international coalition.
Theorem 1. For each (Ω,K, y˘) ∈ [0; Ω¯]N × [0, K¯]N × [0, ¯˘y], C(Ω,K, y˘) contains an infinity of
elements.
This theorem states that, if the countries of a coalition follow a long-term cooperation strat-
egy in terms of extraction, investment and induced trade, then the best way to optimize their
own consumption while caring about future generations is to form a global coalition. The recur-
sive core is constituted of the streams of consumption to be allocated to each country. Since this
core is not reduced to a singleton, it is possible to compare the different distribution policies and
to select a policy among these allocations. For instance, a fairness criteria could be developed
in the tradition of the axiomatic methodology in order to explore possible ethic consumption
paths. This last point, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and constitutes an open av-
enue for further research. An interesting lead would be to study the nucleolus solution concept
(Schmeidler, 1969), which maximizes recursively the ‘welfare’ of the worst treated coalitions
and can be understood as an application of the Rawlsian social welfare function (Hamlen et al.,
1977). Another lead would be to study a time-consistent Shapley value (Petrosjan and Zaccour,
2003) and to look whether it belongs to the recursive core in our particular setting.
Note that the instantaneous core – the core of vy˘t,ηt at each period t – can be empty even if
the overall core – the core of V Ω0,K0,y˘0 – is not (see Lehrer and Scarsini (2013) for a discussion
on this point). A more profound analysis of the short-run efficient and coalitionaly rational
policies could also be the subject of further research.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We showed that an international cooperation strategy leads to a unique optimal path of collec-
tive production since all the processes involved in this production – namely the extraction of
natural resources from a finite stock, their trade and the evolution of the productive capacity
– should be unique to be optimal. On the demand side, a given part of this production is
optimally allocated to the investment needed to build the productive capacity of each country,
in a unique manner. The remaining part of production, corresponding to the consumption of
goods, can be shared among countries, this time in different manners. The optimal paths could
be interpreted as resulting from quotas chosen by a benevolent planner, but this interpretation
that we propose could be objected. Indeed, imposing commercial quotas is not consistent with
a common definition of free trade. This objection is fully anchored in the socialist calculation
debate (O’Neill, 2004; Stiglitz, 1996; Bardhan and Roemer, 1992) and is not the subject of this
study. Note however that, by definition of optimality, agents should not deviate from these
quotas even in a free market interpretation. Another alternative interpretation would be the
result of a negotiation procedure between countries. In all cases, no country would have the
incentive to refuse a core allocation. This last interpretation is linked to the question of the
implementation of cooperative game solutions, also called “Nash program”. This could be the
subject of a subsequent paper.
This set-up provides a basis on which to progress on questions related to the long-term
material development of countries. We support the idea that cooperative game theory provides
a fresh and fairly simple framework to tackle traditional issues raised in growth theory, since
it better takes into account the heterogeneity of a finite number of countries. An interesting
question would be to characterize technological catch-up effects between countries and how it
affects the balance of power, by adding a time-dependent production function or an endogenous
knowledge capital accumulation. Moreover, recycling or pollution effects could be investigated in
our framework and lead to a more holistic understanding of the sustainability of our “Spaceship
Earth” (Boulding, 1966).
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let g : [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S × RS+ → R+ be the function defined as
g((Ω, e,K), z) =
∑
i∈S
(
fi(zi,Ki)− ci(ei,Ωi)
)
,
and C : [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S ⇒ RS+ be the correspondence defined as
C(Ω, e,K) = Ze(S).
By continuity and strict concavity of fi and −ci for each i ∈ S, function g is continuous and
strictly concave on [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S × RS+. Clearly, C is a compact-valued continuous
correspondence on [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S and has a convex graph. We have the needed
conditions to apply Berge’s Maximum Theorem under Convexity (Sundaram, 1996, p.237). We
conclude that max{g((Ω, e,K), z), z ∈ C(Ω, e,K)} is a continuous and strictly concave function
on [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S and C∗(Ω, e,K) = argmax { g((Ω, e,K), z), z ∈ C(Ω, e,K)} is a
continuous single-valued function.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Existence. The existence of an optimal path of extraction and investment is a direct
application of a well-established theorem of existence in dynamic optimization (see for instance
Theorem 12.19 in Sundaram (1996, p.298)). Indeed,
(i) The reward function (y˘(S), η) 7→ vy˘(S),η(S) is continuous and bounded on [0, ¯˘y]× [0, ¯˘y]S .
(ii) It is clear that (Ω, e) 7→ Ω− e is continuous from [0, Ω¯]S × [0, Ω¯]S to [0, Ω¯]S . In addition,
(K, η) 7→ (1 − τ)K + η is continuous from [0, K¯]S × [0, ¯˘y]S to [0, K¯]S . By Proposition 1,
(Ω, e,K) 7→ max
{∑
i∈S fi(zi,Ki)− ci(ei,Ωi), (zi)i∈S ∈ Ze(S)
}
is continuous on [0, Ω¯]S ×
[0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S . Hence, the transition function is continuous.
(iii) The feasible action correspondence (Ω, y˘(S)) 7→ ΦΩ,y˘(S)(S) is compact-valued and contin-
uous.
Uniqueness. Assume by way of contradiction that there exist two different optimal paths
(e0t , η0t )t∈N and (e1t , η1t )t∈N when the initial vector is (Ω0, K0, y˘0(S)) for a coalition S.
We denote by (Ω0t )t∈N and (Ω1t )t∈N the respective sequence of resource stock vectors defined
by Ω00 = Ω0, Ω10 = Ω0 and for each t > 0, Ω0t+1 = Ω0t − e0t and Ω1t+1 = Ω1t − e1t . We denote
by (K0t )t∈N and (K1t )t∈N the respective sequence of capital stock vectors defined by K00 = K0,
K10 = K0 and for each t > 0, K0t+1 = (1 − τ)K0t + η0t and K1t+1 = (1 − τ)K1t + η1t . For each
α ∈ [0, 1], we define the path of extraction (eαt )t∈N as follows:
∀t ∈ N, eαt = αe1t + (1− α)e0t ;
the path of investment (ηαt )t∈N is defined as:
∀t ∈ N, ηαt = αη1t + (1− α)η0t .
Let (Ωαt )t∈N be the sequence of resource stock vectors defined by Ωα0 = Ω0 and for each t ∈ N
by Ωαt+1 = Ωαt − eαt . A simple induction leads to Ωαt = αΩ1t + (1− α)Ω0t for each t ∈ N.
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Let (Kαt )t∈N be the sequence of capital stock vectors defined by Kα0 = K0 and for each t ∈ N
by Kαt+1 = (1− τ)Kαt + ηαt . A simple induction leads to Kαt = αK1t + (1−α)K0t for each t ∈ N.
We set y˘α0 (S) = y˘0(S) and for each t > 0,
y˘αt (S) = max
{∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t−1,Kαi,t−1)− ci(eαi,t−1,Ωαi,t−1), (zi,t−1)i∈S ∈ Ze
α
t−1(S)
}
.
We define for each t ∈ N the following vectors2:
(z∗0i,t)i∈S = argmax
(zi,t)i∈S∈Ze
0
t (S)
∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,K0i,t)− ci(e0i,t,Ω0i,t),
and
(z∗1i,t)i∈S = argmax
(zi,t)i∈S∈Ze
1
t (S)
∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,K1i,t)− ci(e1i,t,Ω1i,t).
We also define (zαt )t∈N as follows:
∀t ∈ N, zαt = αz∗1t + (1− α)z∗0t .
It is straightforward to see that ∑
i∈S
ηαi,0 ≤ y˘0 = y˘α0 , (2)
and for each t ∈ N,∑
i∈S
ηαi,t+1 = α
∑
i∈S
η1i,t+1 + (1− α)
∑
i∈S
η0i,t+1
≤ α
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗1i,t ,K1i,t)− ci(e1i,t,Ω1i,t)
)
+ (1− α)
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗0i,t ,K0i,t)− ci(e0i,t,Ω0i,t)
)
.
By concavity of fi and −ci, we therefore have∑
i∈S
ηαi,t+1 ≤
∑
i∈S
(
fi(zαi,t,Kαi,t)− ci(eαi,t,Ωαi,t)
)
. (3)
Since for each t ∈ N, (zαi,t)i∈S ∈ Ze
α
t (S), it follows that
∑
i∈S
(
fi(zαi,t,Kαi,t)− ci(eαi,t,Ωαi,t)
)
≤ max
{∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,Kαi,t)− ci(eαi,t,Ωαi,t), (zi,t)i∈S ∈ Ze
α
t (S)
}
= y˘αt+1. (4)
By combining Eqs 2, 3 and 4, we deduce that for each t ∈ N,∑
i∈S
ηαi,t ≤ y˘αt . (5)
On the other hand, it is clear that
eα0 ≤ Ω0,
and for each t ∈ N,
eαt+1 = αe1t+1 + (1− α)e0t+1 ≤ α(Ω1t − e1t ) + (1− α)(Ω0t − e0t ) = Ωαt − eαt . (6)
2It follows from Proposition 1 that both vectors are uniquely defined.
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Therefore, from Eqs 5 and 6, we can conclude that (eαt , ηαt )t∈N is a feasible path. It follows
that
V Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S) ≥
∑
t∈N
δtvy˘
α
t (S),ηαt (S)
=
∑
t∈N
δt
(
y˘αt (S)−
∑
i∈S
ηαi,t
)
≥
(
y˘0(S)−
∑
i∈S
ηαi,0
)
+
∑
t>0
δt
(∑
i∈S
(
fi(zαi,t−1,Kαi,t−1)− ci(eαi,t−1,Ωαi,t−1)
)
− ηαi,t
))
.
(7)
By strict concavity of fi and −ci, we have for each t > 0:∑
i∈S
(
fi(zαi,t−1,Kαi,t−1)− ci(eαi,t−1,Ωαi,t−1)
)
> α
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗1i,t−1,K1i,t−1)− ci(e1i,t−1,Ω1i,t−1)
)
+ (1− α)
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗0i,t−1,K0i,t−1)− ci(e0i,t−1,Ω0i,t−1)
)
.
(8)
Combining Eqs 7 and 8 leads to:
V Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S) > α
((
y˘0(S)−
∑
i∈S
η1i,0
)
+
∑
t>0
δt
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗1i,t−1,K1i,t−1)− ci(e1i,t−1,Ω1i,t−1)
)
− η1i,t
))
+ (1− α)
((
y˘0(S)−
∑
i∈S
η0i,0
)
+
∑
t>0
δt
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗0i,t−1,K0i,t−1)− ci(e0i,t−1,Ω0i,t−1)
)
− η0i,t
))
= αV Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S) + (1− α)V Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S)
= V Ω0,K0,y˘0(S)(S).
The strict inequality leads to a contradiction.
Appendix B
First, let us recall some definitions, notations, and useful results of the cooperative game theory
in order to demonstrate Theorem 1. Let N denote a fixed finite nonempty set with n members,
who will be called agents or players. Coalitions of players are nonempty subsets of N .
A transferable utility (TU) game on N is a pair (N, v) where v is a mapping v : 2N → R
satisfying v(∅) = 0. We denote by G(N) the set of all games over N . For any coalition S, v(S)
represents the worth of S, i.e., what coalition S could earn regardless of other players.
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ RN that assigns to agent i the payoff xi. A payoff vector is
efficient with respect to (N, v) if ∑i∈N xi = v(N); it is coalitionally rational if ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S)
for every possible coalition S.
The core of (N, v), denoted by C(N, v), is the set, possibly empty, of efficient and coalitionally
rational payoff vectors:
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ RN : ∀S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) and
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
}
.
The interpretation of the core is that no group of agents has an incentive to split from
the grand coalition N and form a smaller coalition S since they collectively receive at least as
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much as what they can obtain for themselves as a coalition. The so-called Bondareva-Shapley
theorem (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) provides a sufficient and necessary condition under
which the core of a TU-game is nonempty. First, we introduce the concept of balanced maps.
A balanced map λ : 2N −→ [0, 1] is such that:
λ(∅) = 0, and ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S3i
λ(S) = 1.
Denote by B(N) the set of balanced maps over N .
Proposition 3. (Bondareva-Shapley Theorem)
For each TU-game (N, v), C(N, v) 6= ∅ if and only if for each balanced map λ ∈ B(N), the
following inequality holds: ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N). (9)
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Corollary 1 in (Gonzalez and Grabisch,
2015).
Proposition 4. If, for each balanced map λ ∈ B(N) such that λ(N) 6= 1 the following strict
inequality holds: ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)v(S) < v(N),
then C(N, v) contains an infinity of elements.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: For each Ω0(N) ∈ [0, Ω¯]N , K0(N) ∈ [0, K¯]N and y˘0(N) ∈ [0, ¯˘y],
C(N,V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)) 6= ∅
and contains an infinity of elements.
By Proposition 2, for each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , and each initial stock vector(
Ω0(S),K0(S), y˘0(S)
)
∈ [0, Ω¯]S × [0, K¯]S × [0, ¯˘y],
there exists a unique optimal path
(
e∗t (S), η∗t (S)
)
t∈N
to the dynamic programming problem
(1). For each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , denote by (Ω∗t (S))t∈N the sequence of resource stock
vectors defined by Ω∗0(S) = Ω0(S) and for each t ∈ N, Ω∗t+1(S) = Ω∗t (S)− e∗t (S). Denote as well
by (K∗t (S))t∈N the sequence of capital stock vectors defined by K∗0 (S) = K0(S) and for each
t ∈ N, K∗t+1(S) = (1− τ)K∗t (S) + η∗t (S). Finally, denote (y˘∗t (S))t∈N the sequence of production
flow vectors defined by y˘∗0(S) = y˘0(S) and for each t ∈ N,
y˘∗t+1(S) = max
{∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S)), (zi,t(S))i∈S ∈ Ze
∗
t (S)(S)
}
.
Let λ ∈ B(N) be a balanced system of N . If λ(N) = 1, it is clear that
V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)(N) =
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)V Ω0(S),K0(S),y˘0(S)(S).
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Assume λ(N) 6= 1. We define (eλt (N))t∈N ∈ (RN+ )N and (Ωλt (N))t∈N ∈ (RN+ )N as follows:
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, eλi,t(N) =
∑
S3i
λ(S)e∗i,t(S),
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, Ωλi,t(N) =
∑
S3i
λ(S)Ω∗i,t(S).
Observe that for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ N, we have Ωλi,t(N) ∈ [0, Ω¯] since
∑
S3i λ(S) = 1
and Ωλi,t+1(N) = Ωλi,t(N)− eλi,t(N). We also can assert that for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ N,
eλi,t(N) ≤ Ωλi,t(N). (10)
We define as well (ηλt (N))t∈N ∈ (RN+ )N and (Kλt (N))t∈N ∈ (RN+ )N as follows:
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, ηλi,t(N) =
∑
S3i
λ(S)η∗i,t(S),
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, Kλi,t(N) =
∑
S3i
λ(S)K∗i,t(S).
Observe that for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ N, we haveKλi,t(N) ∈ [0, K¯]. We set y˘λ0 (N) = y˘0(N)
and for each t > 0,
y˘λt (N) = max
{∑
i∈N
fi(zi,t−1(N),Kλi,t−1(N))−ci(eλi,t−1(N),Ωλi,t−1(N)), (zi,t−1(N))i∈N ∈ Ze
λ
t−1(N)(N)
}
.
Observe that for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ N, we have y˘λi,t(N) ∈ [0, ¯˘y]. It is straightforward
to see that ∑
i∈N
ηλi,0(N) ≤ y˘0(N) = y˘λ0 (N), (11)
and for each t ∈ N,∑
i∈N
ηλi,t+1(N) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)η∗i,t+1(S)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
η∗i,t+1(S) (12)
≤
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘∗i,t+1(S)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗i,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S)
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)
(
fi(z∗i,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S)
)
,
where we define, for each t ∈ N,
z∗t (S) = argmax
(zi,t(S))i∈S∈Ze
∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
fi(zi,t,K∗i,t)− ci(e∗i,t,Ω∗i,t).
By concavity of fi and −ci, we therefore have∑
i∈N
ηλi,t+1(N) ≤
∑
i∈N
(
fi(zλi,t(N),Kλi,t(N))− ci(eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N))
)
(13)
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where (zλt (N))t∈N ∈ (RN+ )N is defined as
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, zλi,t(N) =
∑
S3i
λ(S)z∗i,t(S).
The following equalities hold:∑
i∈N
eλi,t(N) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)e∗i,t(S)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
e∗i,t(S).
Since z∗t (S) ∈ Ze
∗
t (S), it follows that∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
e∗i,t(S) =
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
z∗i,t(S)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)z∗i,t(S)
=
∑
i∈N
zλi,t(N),
from which we deduce that zλt (N) ∈ Ze
λ
t (N)(N) for each t ∈ N. It follows that∑
i∈N
(
fi(zλi,t(N),Kλi,t(N))− ci(eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N))
)
≤ max
{∑
i∈N
fi(zi,t(N),Kλi,t(N))
− ci(eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N)), (zi,t(N))i∈N ∈ Ze
λ
t (N)(N)
}
= y˘λt+1(N). (14)
By combining Eqs 11, 13 and 14, we deduce that for each t ∈ N,∑
i∈N
ηλi,t(N) ≤ y˘λt (N). (15)
We can conclude from Eqs 10 and 15 that (eλt (N), ηλt (N))t∈N is a feasible path.
By definition of y˘λt (N) for each t ∈ N, and since zλt (N) ∈ Ze
λ
t (N)(N) for each t ∈ N, we have
y˘λt+1(N) ≥
∑
i∈N
(
fi(zλi,t(N),Kλi,t(N))− ci(eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N))
)
. (16)
The hypothesis of strict concavity ensures that∑
i∈N
(
fi(zλi,t(N),Kλi,t(N))− ci(eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N))
)
>
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)
(
fi(z∗i,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S))
)
(17)
because for each i ∈ N and t ∈ N, zλi,t(N) (resp. Kλi,t(N), eλi,t(N),Ωλi,t(N)) is a convex combina-
tion of (z∗i,t(S))S3i (resp. (K∗i,t(S))S3i, (e∗i,t(S))S3i, (Ω∗i,t(S))S3i).
Combining Eqs. 16 and 17, we have:
y˘λt+1(N) >
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)
(
fi(z∗i,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S))
)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
(
fi(z∗i,t(S),K∗i,t(S))− ci(e∗i,t(S),Ω∗i,t(S))
)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘∗t+1(S). (18)
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Since (eλt (N), ηλt (N))t∈N is a feasible path, and that Ωλ0(N) = Ω0(N), Kλ0 (N) = K0(N) and
y˘λ0 (N) = y˘0(N), the definition of V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)(N) ensures that
V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)(N) ≥
∑
t∈N
δt
(
y˘λt (N)−
∑
i∈N
ηλi,t(N)
)
.
Moreover, observe that
y˘0(N) =
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘0(S). (19)
Indeed, ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘0(S) =
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
y˘i,0
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S3i
λ(S)y˘i,0
=
∑
i∈N
y˘i,0
∑
S3i
λ(S)
=
∑
i∈N
y˘i,0.
Using Eqs. 19, 12 and 18, we obtain
V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)(N) =
(
y˘0(N)−
∑
i∈N
ηλ0 (N)
)
+
∑
t>0
δt
(
y˘λt (N)−
∑
i∈N
ηλi,t(N)
)
>
( ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘0(S)−
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
η∗i,0(S)
)
+
∑
t>0
δt
( ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)y˘∗t (S)−
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
i∈S
η∗i,t(S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
∑
t∈N
δt
(
y˘∗t (S)−
∑
i∈S
η∗i,t(S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)V Ω0(S),K0(S),y˘0(S)(S).
The strict inequality holds by strict concavity and since λ(N) 6= 1.
By Proposition 3 stating the Bondareva-Shapley theorem, C(N,V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)) 6= ∅ and
by Proposition 4, C(N,V Ω0(N),K0(N),y˘0(N)) contains an infinity of elements.
Step 2: Existence and non uniqueness of the solution.
Step 1 states that for each state (Ω,K, y˘), the core C(N,V Ω,K,y˘) is nonempty. Hence, for each
initial state (Ω,K, y˘) we can build a sequence ((Xi,t(Ω,K, y˘))i∈N )t∈N - or simply ((Xi,t)i∈N )t∈N
- such that for each t ∈ N:
(i) ∑i∈N Xi,t = V Ω∗t (N),K∗t (N),y˘∗t (N)(N),
(ii) ∑i∈S Xi,t ≥ V Ω∗S,t(N),K∗S,t(N),y˘∗S,t(N)(S),
where (Ω∗t (N),K∗t (N), y˘∗t (N))t∈N is the sequence of state vectors associated with the optimal
extraction and investment path of N when the initial state is (Ω,K, y˘).
Let the instantaneous allocation path for each country be (xi,t(Ω,K, y˘))i∈N,t∈N - or simply
(xi,t)i∈N,t∈N - defined for each initial state (Ω,K, y˘) such that for each t ∈ N, xi,t = Xi,t−δXi,t+1.
Let us first show that (xi,t)i∈N,t∈N is an international distribution policy. For each t ∈ N,
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∑
i∈N
xi,t =
∑
i∈N
Xi,t − δ
∑
i∈N
Xi,t+1
= V Ω∗t (N),K∗t (N),y˘∗t (N)(N)− δV Ω∗t+1(N),K∗t+1(N),y˘∗t+1(N)(N)
and the Bellman equation ensures that:
V Ω
∗
t (N),K∗t (N),y˘∗t (N)(N) = vy˘∗t (N),η∗t (N)(N) + δV Ω∗t+1(N),K∗t+1(N),y˘∗t+1(N)(N).
Therefore, we have for each t ∈ N,∑
i∈N
xi,t = vy˘
∗
t (N),η∗t (N)(N).
Let us now prove that (xi,t)i∈N,t∈N is an undominated policy. For each T ∈ N, we have
∑
i∈S
∞∑
t=0
δtxi,t+T =
∑
i∈S
∞∑
t=0
(
δtXi,t+T − δt+1Xi,t+T+1
)
=
∑
i∈S
Xi,T
≥ V Ω∗S,T (N),K∗S,T (N),y˘∗S,T (N)(S).
We can therefore conclude that the set C(Ω,K, y˘) of undominated policies when the initial
state is (Ω,K, y˘) is nonempty. Since we established in Step 1 that for each state (Ω,K, y˘),
C(N,V Ω,K,y˘) contains an infinity of elements, we deduce by construction of (xi,t)i∈N,t∈N that
C(Ω,K, y˘) also contains an infinity of elements.
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